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I. Introduction
TRIPs, the intellectual property component of the Uruguay round GATT Treaty, gave rise to
an acrimonious debate between the developed countries and less developed countries (LDCs).  On one
side, business interests in the developed world claimed large losses from the imitation and use of their
innovations in  LDCs.  They also asserted  that establishing  strong  intellectual property rights  would
actually benefit the developing countries by encouraging foreign investment, the transfer of technology
and  greater  domestic  research  and  development  (R&D).  On  the  other  side,  LDC  governments
adamantly opposed this view, worrying about the higher prices that stronger intellectual property rights
would entail and about the harm that their introduction might cause to infant high tech industries.
No country was more actively involved in opposing this component of the GATT agreement
than India and no part of TRIPs was, and continues to be, more sensitive than the proposal to require
product patents for pharmaceutical innovations.  The national sentiment on this issue is well captured
in an often quoted statement made by Indira Gandhi at the World Health Assembly in 1982: "The idea
of a better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no
profiteering from life and death."
What  is  striking  about  the  original  TRIPs  debate  and  the  continuing  discussions  about
pharmaceutical product patents is the divergence between the strength of the claims made by both sides
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and the weakness of the empirical foundations for those claims.  Now that the treaty has been signed
and most of the developing world is committed to introducing pharmaceutical product patents by the
year 2004, not only do we not know how much this may effect their welfare, we do not even know the
direction of the effect.  This ignorance has political implications.  India, for example, agreed to this
aspect of the treaty much against her will, believing it to be harmful to her interests.  As a result, the
implementing legislation is currently on the shelf,  unable  to get  through  parliament.  If  it  could  be
shown,  empirically, that product  patents, in  fact, conveyed  some benefits  to the country, it  would
increase  the local  political  will both to pass legislation  and  to enforce patentee rights  with  greater
enthusiasm.  If, on the other hand, it could be shown that the net effect of this part of World Trade
Organization (WTO) membership will be, in fact, very costly to the developing countries, it would put
them in a stronger position from which to argue that they should receive concessions on other fronts
in future international negotiations.
Apart from the immediate interest in the effects of this particular policy change, the sheer size
of the change, together with the fact that it was, essentially, imposed  from without,  makes  it  a  rare
opportunity to examine  the economic effects  of  granting  patent rights.  In  the  aftermath  of  the
signing of the GATT treaty, we are in a situation where a large part of the world is moving from no
protection to full-fledged twenty year protection of intellectual property rights in the one area where,
it  is  thought, patents really  matter: pharmaceuticals.  Further,  unlike  the historical introduction of
pharmaceutical product patents in much of the developed world the group  of  countries  which  will be
newly granting  rights  in  product  innovations have distinctly different demands  for drugs  than those
which  currently grant such rights.  Thus, there is  some hope for detecting  incentive effects  in  the
pattern of R&D spending.
This paper focuses on India.  After a brief history, it sets out in Section III the various ways in
which  the introduction of  product  patents for pharmaceuticals may, in  theory, benefit  or  hurt the
country.  In the sections  which  follow,  it  brings  together information from a variety of  sources  to
assess what can be expected, now, about the importance of  each of  these various  potential effects. 
While firm conclusions must await further analysis  as  the treaty requirements  are  implemented, the
paper gives some indication of where one might or might not expect to see change occurring.
I obtained  much of  the information presented  in  this study  while  on  leave  in  India  from
September, 1996, to March, 1997.   Over the six months I was able to interview a wide range of people
(see Appendix  I).  Executives  from Indian  firms  and  the subsidiaries  of  multinational  corporations3
(MNCs) were very generous with their time, and also allowed me to tour their R&D facilities.  Industry
group representatives from the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India and the Indian Drug
Manufacturers' Association, as  well as  members  of  the  National  Working  Group  on  Patent  Laws,
provided a great deal of documented information and as well as insight  on  the current  and  historical
situation.  Attendance at a conference held by the Forum of Parliamentarians on Intellectual Property,
a meeting of the U.S.-Indian Business Forum, and a gathering of Indian medical professionals, scientists,
and government representatives sponsored by Pfizer was invaluable for getting a sense of the domestic
and international political aspects of the policy change.  Details of the administrative, regulatory and
enforcement issues  were gained  from interviews  with the Drug Controller General,  the head  of  the
Chemists' Association and a number of Indian patent attorneys.  Information was also provided by the
Delhi  branch  of  the Indian  Patent Office,  the Export Promotion Agency  (CHEMEXCIL)  and  the
Department of Science and Technology.
II. The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Indian Patent System
In 1970, India put into place a series  of  policies  aimed  at moving  the country towards  self-
sufficiency in medicines.  At this time, the national sector was very small, estimated at less than 25%
of the domestic pharmaceutical market (Redwood, 1994).  Of the top ten firms by retail sales, only two
were Indian firms and the rest were subsidiaries of multinationals (see Table 1).  Much of the country's
pharmaceutical consumption was met by imports.
An important part of the policy package was the passage of the Patents Act 1970 (effective
April, 1972). This legislation greatly weakened intellectual property protection in  India,  particularly
for pharmaceutical innovations.  Pharmaceutical product  innovations, as  well as  those for food and
agrochemicals, became unpatentable, allowing innovations patented elsewhere to be freely copied  and
marketed in  India.  The statutory term was  shortened to 5 to 7  years  on  pharmaceutical process
patents and automatic licensing was put in place.  (See Appendix II for details.)  As a result, the number
of patents granted per year fell by three-quarters over the following decade, from 3,923 in 1970-71 (of
which 629 were to Indian  applicants, 3,294 to foreign  applicants) down to 1,019 in  1980-81 (349
Indian, 670 foreign) (OPPI, 1996a).  Although  all  inventors were affected  by  the weakened  patent
regime, it is clear that foreigners, in particular, no longer found taking out a patent in India worthwhile.
Other  aspects  of  the  policy  package  set  up  to  encourage  the  domestic  production  of4
pharmaceuticals included  restrictions on  the import of  finished  formulations, high tariff rates,  ratio
requirements (where imports of bulk drugs had to be matched by purchases from domestic sources at a
fixed ratio) and equity  ceilings  on  foreign  participation.  Further,  the strict price control regulation
which  was  introduced  with  the  1970 Drugs  Price  Control  Order,  while  making  the  production  of
pharmaceuticals  less  profitable  for  all  firms  selling  in  the  Indian  market,  made  it  relatively  less
interesting for foreign  firms  with market options  elsewhere.  Thus  even the  price  control  regime
probably contributed to the shift towards a greater share of production being met by Indian firms. 
Supported by this regulatory environment, by  1991, Indian  firms  accounted  for 70%  of  the
bulk drugs and 80% of formulations produced in the country (Hamied, 1993).  Of the top ten firms by
1996  pharmaceutical  sales,  six  are  now  Indian  firms  rather  than  the  subsidiaries  of  foreign
multinationals (Table 1).  Domestic firms now produce about 350 of the 500 bulk drugs consumed  in
the country (Government of India, 1994a).  Employment in the pharmaceutical sector was estimated
to have reached almost half a million by 1995 (OPPI, 1996b).
III. The Economic Effects of the Introduction of Product Patents: Theory
There is a well-known tradeoff implicit in using a patent system to encourage innovation.  On
the one hand are the static costs  associated  with monopoly pricing  and, on  the other, the dynamic
gains associated with innovation.  We  first briefly  review  briefly  this tradeoff in  the standard  single
country setting and then consider the new issues which arise in a multi-country world.
Figure A shows the demand in India for a newly marketed drug (the solid line marked DI).  If we
assume  that in  the  absence  of  patent  protection  innovations  are  freely  available  then,  without
protection, price is equal to marginal cost, MC, and output is  Qc.  When the inventor is  allowed  to
obtain a patent and prices the drug to maximize his profits from the Indian market, the price is Pm and
output falls to Qm.  The triangle 'D' represents the welfare  loss to Indian  consumers  associated  with
introducing product  patents.  In  addition  to this deadweight  loss are  the costs  of  administering  the
patent system and enforcing patentee rights through the courts when there are infringement disputes.
There are several possible sources of dynamic gains to be had from granting patent protection. 
The inventor's profits, the square marked 'P', is the most obvious source of dynamic gains.  Without
protection, inventors do  not appropriate the benefits  of  new  drug innovations and  so  have a sub-5
optimal incentive to invest  in  the research  and  development to discover,  test,  and  bring  them to
market.  Because  patents allow  inventors to appropriate more of  the consumer  surplus  from their
innovations, granting patents may increase welfare by stimulating additional R&D investment.
A second  source  of  potential  dynamic  gains  comes  from the  disclosure  requirement  today
common to all patent laws: specifications must be written to enable any person “skilled in the art” to
make use  of  the innovation.   As  patentees  reveal  their  innovations  in  their  patent  applications,
information about new technologies becomes more quickly available  to others as  an  input into their
own R&D.
Finally, the availability of patents may increase the efficiency of the production of drugs and
the efficiency of the research to discover and develop new  drugs  by  facilitating contracting between
firms.  The innovating firm is able to reveal its innovation without losing control and hence may be
able to sub-contract parts of the development work at lower cost.  Similarly,  the firm may be  more
willing to license the patented innovation to manufacturing firms for production.  Arora (1996) points
to the role that patents play in providing a means to contract for the transfer of  the ‘know-how’
associated with innovations, a component of knowledge which may be particularly important to firms
in developing countries.
When considering the welfare of a single country which exists in  a  multi-country world,  new
considerations arise.
Static Effects
In a single country world, the identity of inventors is not important.  The transfer of benefits
from the hands of consumers, in the form of consumer surplus, into the hands of inventors, in the form
of profits (the square P) arising from the price increase may have distributional implications, but  the
effect of the transfer can be offset by domestic policies.  It is not a net cost to the country.  In a multi-
country world, however, the static costs to one country of introducing patent protection depend  not
only on the size of the deadweight loss 'D' but on who is doing the inventing.  If,  for example,  the
newly available patent rights for pharmaceuticals in India are assigned entirely to inventors elsewhere,
then the loss of consumer surplus 'P' is a net cost to India.  All of the profits accrue to foreign nationals
in the form of royalties, if production remains in India but under license, or  as  export profits if  the
patented drugs  are  sourced  from elsewhere  and  imported to serve  the Indian  market.  If  the  latter6
occurs, and local production is replaced by imports, the cost associated with the introduction of product
patents is exacerbated by a loss of employment, a negative shift in the balance payments, and a loss of
self-sufficiency.  (See Helpman,  1994, for a general  equilibrium  model  of  increasing  patent strength
which incorporates terms of trade effects.)
Of course, some of the newly granted patents will be owned by Indians.  For these, the profits
remain in the country and the situation resembles again the one-country case described above.
It is important to realize, in particular when trying to understand the strength of multinational
corporations' (MNCs') lobbying efforts during the TRIPs negotiations, that in  a  multi-country world
there are two relevant demand curves.  That for India (or the group of LDCs) and the other for the
patent protected world (see Fgure A; dashed line marked Dw).   In  the ‘world’,  the patentee receives,
each period, profits as indicated by the large dashed box--until the patent expires and there is generic
entry to bid down the price.  A crucial feature of India's lack of protection for pharmaceutical products
is that it has enabled Indian firms to develop commercial production capabilities  for on-patent drugs
before patent expiry and move rapidly into the world market with them on the day the patents have
lapsed.  This means that the introduction of patent protection in India will confer an additional benefit
on patent owners, over and above any profits obtained from sales in the Indian market: it will delay the
erosion  of  the profits derived  from world  sales  of  patented  drugs  which  comes  about  with  generic
competition.  Is this important?  It has been estimated that just before patent expiry Glaxo-Wellcome
was earning a profit of around 7 million dollars per day from sales of Zantac (The Economist, April 26,
1997).
The flipside of this gain to patentees is that introducing product patents imposes an additional
cost on India, this time to Indian firms rather than consumers, by lowering the profits earned by Indian
firms as a result of their first-mover advantage.  (It also imposes a cost on 'world' consumers in higher
prices, but they are not the focus of our analysis here.)
Finally, in a multi-country world one must ask where  R&D will take place.  The improvements
in effeciency which may be obtained through licensing when patents are available, may go hand in hand
with a shift from domestic, imitative, R&D to a strategy of purchasing technology from elsewhere, if
these two  strategies  are  substitutes.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  technologies  purchased  from others
complement domestic  R&D  efforts then this aspect  of  the  availability  of  patents  may  encourage
greater domestic research efforts. In a multi-country world firms also have many options in  deciding7
where to locate R&D facilities  and  obtaining  this type of  direct  investment can  be  beneficial:  local
firms have been shown to receive positive spillovers from the R&D  performed by  neighboring  firms
(see  Jaffe,  Trajtenberg  and  Henderson).  The  position  that  a  country  takes  towards  intellectual
property may influence  whether  it  is  viewed  as  a  favorable  location  for  such  investment.  (The
evidence is mixed; see Maskus, 1996.)  There may be real economic reasons why intellectual property
laws matter to location decisions.  Beyond these, a country's stance  on  intellectual property may be
given further importance by being treated as a signal of its business climate more generally.
Dynamic Effects
We have seen that the static costs to a country which  is  introducing  patent protection in  a
multi-country world may be higher than the standard one-country model  would  suggest.  It has  been
argued that the offsetting dynamic gains to additional  patent rights  may also be  minimal  in  a  world
where patents are already available to protect much of the global market.  With profits coming from
other patent protected markets, those created by the newly available rights are only incremental, may
be  small,  and,  with  diminishing  returns  to  R&D,  may  stimulate  negligible  amounts  of  additional
innovation. (See Chin and Grossman, 1990; and Deardorff, 1992, for formal models which capture this
feature.)  This suggests that the group of countries who are introducing product patents as a result of
WTO membership may face higher consumer drug prices and a loss of industry profit and employment,
for little gain in new pharmaceuticals.
There are grounds, however, for thinking that this paints too gloomy a picture.  It may be the
case that the incremental returns created by monopoly profits in these LDCs are, currently, too small
to stimulate much new discovery research.  But existing drug innovations are  only useful  if  they are
developed and introduced.  Innovations are  not, in  fact, 'freely  available'.  The process  of  adapting
pharmaceuticals products to local conditions, obtaining marketing approval and developing the market
must be done in every country individually and it is a costly affair.  While the profits associated with
India's introduction of patent protection may have little effect on world drug discovery they may have
a large effect on the willingness of foreign or domestic firms to invest in marketing in India drugs which
would, in any event, have been discovered.  As discussed below, the issues here are directly akin to those
surrounding orphan drugs.  On the other hand, it is also possible that an inventor with the ability  to
monopolize the market may, for reasons associated with the global market, chose to delay introduction
longer than the time that domestic firms would otherwise have been able to launch their own imitative
products.  Thus it is not clear whether introducing product patents will speed up or slow the availability8
of drugs to Indian consumers.
Most important, perhaps, in determining whether there will be significant dynamic benefits to
be  gained  from the new  patent rights  is  the fact that demand  patterns for pharmaceuticals differ. 
Although  the new  rights  may  contribute  very incrementally  to  the  overall  returns  to  R&D,  the
additional profits may represent a sizable addition to the returns to doing certain types of R&D.  Just as
patent protection in India might make it profitable to obtain marketing approval in  India  for a new
drug, it may also add significantly to the incentives to discover a cure for leprosy.  Long ago Vernon
(1957)  observed  "that  inventors  in  the  industrialized  areas  of  the  world  may  need  some  special
incentive to concentrate their talents on products of special utility to underdeveloped areas."  (Quoted
in Seibeck, et. al., 1982).  The benefit to the 'South' of introducing patent protection when demands
differ is explored formally in Diwan and Rodrik (1991)
IV.  Evidence: Static Price Effects
To estimate the size of  the deadweight  loss that will be  associated  with the introduction of
product patents in India one needs to know two things.  First the extent to which prices will be higher
for new on-patent drugs as a result of patent protection and second, the consumer surplus lost as the
result of given price increases.
Pharmaceutical Prices
Consider first the likely increase in prices.  How much the granting of legal monopoly rights to
an  inventor enhances his  ability  to raise  prices  above  marginal  cost depends,  firstly,  the extent to
which it is possible to extract rents without patent protection.  In India, this seems to be small for most
drugs.  The pharmaceutical market in India currently appears to be competitive.  There are a multitude
of manufacturers: in addition to 250 large pharmaceutical firms and about 9,000 registered small-scale
units,  the  Indian  Drug  Manufacturers'  Association  (IDMA)  estimates  that  there  another  7,000
unregistered small-scale units producing drugs (Clippings, 12/93).  Seven years after its introduction in
India, there were 48 firms offering the important on-patent drug Ciprofloxacin  for sale in  the 1996
Pharmaceuticals Guide.  The U.K. multinational Glaxo was faced with several local competitors from
the first day that its subsidiary marketed its proprietary drug Ranitadine (Zantac) in India.  Competition
between MNCs also may be growing.  One executive of an MNC subsidiary suggested in  an  interview9
that the gentleman's agreement which has, over the past decades, kept MNCs from selling other MNC's
on-patent drugs in India is now beginning to break down.
That said, drugs are sold in India under brand names and early entrants with strong brands seem
to have a persistent advantage in the market.  Ghemawat and Kothavala (1996) report that Ranbaxy,
one of the largest Indian pharmaceutical firms, is consistently able to charge a 5 to 10% price premium
(on uncontrolled drugs, see below).  This is partly a reflection of real quality differences in a situation
where quality control is primarily assured by a firm's interest in its reputation.  It is also a reflection of
doctors' strong tendency to prescribe by brand rather than more difficult to remember  generic  names
(interviews).
The third column of Table 2 shows the 1995 Indian prices of the four drugs  with the largest
sales in India among those which were on-patent in Europe in 1995.  The following columns indicate,
for each drug, the ratio of prices in Pakistan, the U.K. and the U.S. for the same dosage form relative
to the price in India.  Although the ratio of Indian prices to those elsewhere differs substantially across
drugs, and this is a  small non-random sample of drugs, it suggests that prices in India for drugs which
are on-patent elsewhere are currently substantially lower than in the countries granting protection.
2
Would they have been higher if India had had in place the type of protection it now is facing? 
This depends on what the patentees would like to do and what they would be allowed to do.
A number of factors might contribute to a high price elasticity of demand for a new patented
drug in India and thus a monopoly price which is not substantially higher than the competitive price. 
First, incomes are low and, with less than 4%  of  the population covered  by  medical  insurance,  drug
expenditures  are  mainly  paid directly  by  consumers  (Redwood,  1994).
3  As  a  result,  consumers  are
likely to be more price sensitive than they are in the developed countries and quicker to switch to less
effective  but  cheaper  alternative  therapies  when  they  exist  or  to  stop  making  drug  purchases
altogether.  Currently many diseases and conditions do have multiple alternative drug therapies which
are off-patent and competitively priced.  In fact, as of the end of 1996, only eight drugs on the World
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benefits (OTA, 1993).10
Health Organization's 7th Model List of Essential Drugs were still under patent protection in Europe. 
Of these, five are designated as 'complementary' rather than 'essential' (Redwood, 1994).  So the option
to switch to a lower-priced drug often seems to be available.  In addition, in interviews I was  told by
people  involved  in  the sale and  distribution  of  pharmaceuticals (not to mention friends  residing  in
Delhi) that it is also relatively easy for consumers  to switch  between  drugs  in  India.  Chemists  quite
freely  substitute  alternative,  usually  lower  priced,  medicines  for  those  prescribed,  and  will  sell
prescription-only pharmaceuticals without scripts.  (The results  of  my  own, sample  of  size one, trial
buying Zantac in Khan Market fully support this view.)
However,  while  all  of  the above  considerations suggest  that Indian  consumers  will  be  very
sensitive to high prices on patented drugs, there are reasons not to take it  for granted.  Income per
capita has  been growing  at about  5  percent per  year during  the past few  years  and  the opening  of
medical insurance provision to private competition is a reform which is being discussed by government
(IMF, 1997).  One also cannot assume  that alternative therapies will always  be  available  to provide
competition for patented drugs.  Table 3 shows the percentage of  the audited  Indian  pharmaceutical
market going to drugs which are on-patent in the U.K. in various therapeutic areas, based on data from
1992.  For example, 84% of the drugs sold to treat antipeptic ulcers contain substances on-patent in
Europe.  While there may be  substitutes,  the dominance  of  the patented drugs  in  some  categories
suggests that they are not very close substitutes and hence would not contribute much to holding down
prices.
A  look at history also  does  not  give  one  much  confidence  that low  incomes  will  put  an
effective lid on prices.  In 1961, at a time when India  had  strong  intellectual property laws,  a  U.S.
Senate Committee headed by Senator Kefauver reported that "'in drugs, generally, India ranks amongst
the highest priced nations of the world.'" (quoted in Hamied, 1993).  Similarly, for the four major drugs
shown in Table 2, the prices in Pakistan, which does grant product patents for pharmaceuticals, are 3
to 14 times higher than in India.  Although Pakistan is  somewhat  richer  than India  (1995 GDP  per
capita was about $419 in Pakistan versus about $334 in India; IMF, 1997) the difference in income is
too small to seem a plausible explanation for most of the observed price differential.
There  is  another  consideration,  one  which  did  not  exist  historically  but  is  of  growing
importance today, which may exert a strong upward pressure on the price that a patent-owning firm
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would choose to set in India.  Patentees maximize global profits.  Increasingly, drug prices in developed
country markets are  being  regulated  using  global  reference pricing.  For  countries  which  fix  ceiling
prices, the price for a newly introduced drug may be linked to its price elsewhere.  This policy may be
explicit, or world prices may be linked, but less directly, to regulatory decisions.  In the U.S., Clinton's
1993 Health Security Act proposed using the lowest price in  22  other countries  as  a  benchmark for
determining  the reasonableness of  prices  set  for newly  introduced  drugs  (Danzon and  Kim, 1995). 
Faced with either situation, patent-owning firms may well chose to sell in India at a price substantially
higher than Pm in Figure A because they do not want to put in jeopardy the prices that they are allowed
in  other  regulated  markets.  The  importance  of  this  reference  pricing  concern  was  brought  up
repeatedly in  interviews  with executives  of  MNCs'  Indian  subsidiaries  (see  Section  VII  for  further
discussion).
However, that an innovating firm would choose to sell at a higher  price when granted  patent
protection is clearly beside the point if it is not allowed to charge a higher price.  One cannot really
think about the effect of product patents in the pharmaceutical industry without being equally attentive
to the price control regime.  India has had, and continues to have, price control on a large part of the
drug market.  There is nothing in the GATT treaty which prevents India from continuing to use price
regulation to protect consumers against patented drugs being sold at high prices.
While appealing, and, on the face of it, simple, this policy is  not straightforward.  First,  the
Indian price control regime is set up such that ceiling prices are determined as a mark-up on input costs
(see Appendix III).  This means that there is  a  'transfer-price loophole'.  An  MNC  may export the
patented active ingredient to its Indian subsidiary at an artificially high transfer price and thereby attain
a  higher  controlled  price  for  its  formulations.  News  reports  suggest  that MNCs  have  not  been
restrained about using this loophole:
"Pfizer charges  $9,000 per  Kg.  for same material  available  from Italy  @  $125 per  Kg." 
"Sandoz  imports  @  $60,000  per  Kg.  item available  from Germany  @  23,000  per  Kg." 
Theobromine imported by an MNC subsidiary at 2,436 Rs/kg  compared  to a price of  1,088
Rs/kg on the international market. (Scrip, quoted in IDMA, 1996; and Clippings, 1993).
However, this practice can be controlled, if it is detected, by GATT rules on  uniform  global  transfer
prices.12
A  patent owner  may also simply  refuse  to supply  a  drug placed  under  what it  views  as  too
stringent price control.  While this is conceivable, it is unlikely that either a foreign or a domestic firm
would relish the type of negative publicity that a refusal to supply  would  create.  Domestic  firms,  in
particular, could be subject to retaliatory pressure by the government.  And the government would have
a good case for waiving the restrictions on  compulsory licensing  as  allowed  by  the GATT treaty in
cases of "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency".
4  Because India has a well
developed industry, allowing domestic firms to obtain compulsory licenses is a  realistic  alternative to
supply by the patentee.
Finally, some patented drugs may be explicitly exempted from the price control regime by the
government.  Currently, in  order  to encourage  domestic  R&D  investment,  indigenously  developed
pharmaceutical products may be declared free of price control for 3 to 10 years, with the number  of
years depending on the extent of the domestic R&D input.  As of 1996, the Department of Scientific
and Industrial Research had issued 37 certifications of indigenous R&D efforts (Government of India,
1996b).  These include  two  companies  who  received  exemptions from price control for developing
indigenous processes to produce Ranatidine (Pharmaceutical Guide, 1996).
5  In the future, some of the
products exempted under this policy will also be patent protected in India.
In the end, the stringency of the price controls actually placed on patented pharmaceuticals will
be the outcome of a complex bargaining process between the government and industry.  The most that
can  be  said with certainty is  that granting  inventors  product  patent  rights,  with  limited  scope  for
compulsory licensing, will strengthen the hand of firms in the negotiations.
The Deadweight Loss
The deadweight  loss  of  Indian  consumer  welfare  that will  result  from the  introduction  of
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disputed by the country of the patentee.
    
5 It would seem that the only possible benefit of this policy could be to firms with strong brands able,
on that basis, to price at a premium, or to single suppliers.  Otherwise, exemption from price control,
given that competitor suppliers remain bound by price control, would seem rather uninteresting.13
product patents will depend, in large part, on how important patented drugs are in total pharmaceutical
sales.  Redwood (1994) gives two figures for June of 1993.  At that time, the top 500 brands  in  the
audited pharmaceuticals market contained 24 active  substances  under  product  patent in  Europe.  (See
Table 4 for the names and years of patent expiration.)  Sales of drugs containing these substances were
only 10.9% of top 500 sales.  Including all brands, 31 substances were on-patent in Europe, and sales of
drugs containing these substances were just 8.4% of total audited sales.  Since audited sales exclude small
firms and government procurement, these figures probably overstate the share of sales in India of drugs
which contain substances under product patent cover elsewhere.  There is no indication here that the
introduction of patent protection is going to have a large effect the welfare of most drug consumers.
6
If the rate of new product innovation is stable over time, in equilibrium the introduction of new
patented drugs will be matched by those going off patent.   Supposing this to be the case, as exclusive
marketing rights  (EMR -  see  Appendix  II)  and  then product  patents  are  introduced  in  India,  the
percentage of the market under patent protection will initially grow but then top off by the year 2015,
probably remaining at a rather low level.
7
One question that it is important to ask here is whether it is reasonable to extrapolate into the
future from current levels of on-patent drugs.  Is the rate of  pharmaceutical innovation likely  to be
stable?  In the past innovation has come in waves, with important breakthroughs, such as  the sulpha
                                                
    
6  Putting a clever  twist  on  these statistics, which  are  repeatedly  used  by  the  supporters  of  the
impending  regime,  the Indian  Drug Manufacturers'  Association  (the industry  lobby  for  the  smaller
domestic, and therefore opposition, firms) makes the following calculation:
Total production of formulations in 1994 Rs. 80 billion
Share covered by foreign patents at 10% Rs.  8 billion
Estimated share of U.S. MNC's at 50% Rs.  4 billion
Loss to U.S. MNCs as calculated by them and
 submitted, and accepted, by the
 U.S. Trade Representative Rs. 14 billion
Gains to Indian manufacturers on same at
 at 4% of sales Rs.  0.16 billion
(IDMA, 1996).
    
7 It is not likely to be the same as the share of the market currently going  to drugs  on-patent in
Europe for two reasons.  First, some products will be  patented in  India  which  are  never patented in
Europe.  Second, the higher prices arising from patent protection may either raise, or lower, the value
of sales of the patented and substitute off-patent drugs relative to what they would have been if  such
protection were not available.14
drugs, followed by incremental developments of  the newly  discovered  families  of  drugs.  There is  a
suggestion that drug research in recent years has been relatively unfruitful so we may currently be at a
low point in terms of  important drugs  still  under  patent cover.  While U.S. FDA  approvals of  new
medical entities have been fairly constant over the past two decades, ranging from 12 to 30 per year
during the period 1976-91 but with no obvious trend (OPPI, 1994), it is claimed that in recent years
they have largely been for 'me-too' type innovations which  do  not represent significant  therapeutic
advances.  The U.S. FDA reported that 84% of the new drugs placed on the market by large U.S. firms
during the period 1981-88 had 'little or no' potential for therapeutic gain over existing drug therapies
(Special Committee on Aging of the U.S. Senate, reported in Hamied, 1993).  Similarly, in a study of
775 New Chemical Entities (NCEs) introduced into the world during the period 1975-89, Barral (1990)
reports that a group of experts rated only 95 as truly innovative.   If there is a new breakthrough  in
chemical-based drug research this pattern could change again, leading to a jump in important patented
drugs.  Further,  biotechnology, and  the inclusion  of  micro-organisms  as  patentable  subject  matter,
present  a  whole  new  opportunity  for  finding  important  and  patentable  new  drug  therapies.  If
biotechnology fulfills its promise or if there is a  new  breakthrough in  chemical-based research,  then
granting product patents for drug innovations could have a much more substantial impact on consumer
welfare than the figures given above would suggest.
Focussing only on the part of the Indian market which will be patent protected, the deadweight
loss of consumer welfare associated  with those patents depends  on  the elasticity of  demand  for the
patented drugs.  Greater price sensitivity may result in lower prices (although, as  noted above,  Indian
demand conditions may not be the overriding concern of patent owners when setting prices in India). 
However,  for  a  given  change  in  price,  greater  sensitivity  implies  a  greater  fall  in  sales  and  a
correspondingly higher deadweight loss as consumers switch to less desirable alternatives or out of the
drug market altogether.
A number  of  estimates have been made of  the  potential  consumer  surplus  loss  from price
increases associated with introducing product patents in India.  The general method followed has been
to assume.a  constant price elasticity demand  function for  patented  drugs  and  a  range  of  ex-ante
industry structures.  Then price and welfare changes are simulated under various assumed elasticities of
demand  and  assuming  that firms  have pricing  freedom  and  no  global  concerns  (see  Nogues,  1993;
Subramanian, 1994; and Maskus and Eby Konan, 1994) .  The most recent and detailed of these studies
is Watal (1996) who breaks down the market by patented drug and links the assumed elasticity to the
level of therapeutic competition.  Her results suggest a fall in social welfare of 33 million US dollars 15
and an average increase in the price of drugs if patents had been available of about 50 percent..
V. Evidence: The Redistribution of Profits and Manufacturing Employment
As  discussed  in  Section  III, in  a  multi-country  world,  the  static  cost associated  with  the
introduction of product patents depends in part on which countries' inventors receive the profits which
are gained through higher prices in India and a longer period before generic entry in the world market. 
Given  current  patterns, it  appears  that most of  these  profits  will,  at  least  initially,  go  to  foreign
inventors.  During the period 1975-1995 only 65 of  approximately 100,000 patents granted  in  the
U.S. for drug and  health innovations were to inventors with an  Indian  address.
8    Initial  'black-box'
applications to the Indian  Patent Office  (those submitted  after January  1,  1995; See  Appendix  II)
suggest too that foreign inventors will be the main beneficiaries of the new product patents regime.  Of
the drug-related  patents granted  in  1995 and  1996, and  therefore process  patents, 39%  and  48%,
respectively, were to domestic firms or inventors (based on the applicant's address) (IDMA, 1996).  In
a sample (about half) of the patent applications made in the first six months of 1995, again 50% of
the applications for process patents were to India resident inventors.  However, in contrast, just 14%
of the applications for product patents were made by domestic inventors (CDRI, 1996a).
The size of  the new  profit  opportunities  in  India,  and  hence  the  transfer  from domestic
consumer  to  foreign  firms,  depends,  like  the  deadweight  loss,  on  the  local  demand  functions  for
patented drugs and the extent to which  patent-owning firms  choose  and  are  permitted to set  prices
above costs.  What about the other profit rectangle, the world generics market?  This market is already
large: in 1995, about half of all U.S. prescriptions were filled with generics  (BCG,  1996).   And  it  is
projected to grow very rapidly.   Being first into this market appears to matter.  A report by Lehman
Brothers (1996) notes that, in the U.S.,  the first generic  entrant can  sell at a 30%  discount  to the
branded  product,  compared  to a 75%  discount  for later entrants.  Another newsletter  reports  that
"Industry experts say...80 per cent [of profits] are milked out of a drug in the first 18 months of its
reincarnation as a generic." CDRI (1996b).  Being  based  in  a  country which  does not grant product
patents helps firms to get into the market earlier.  McFetridge (1996) notes that when Canada stopped
granting its generics manufacturers compulsory licenses  to produce  on-patent drugs,  the firms  "were
                                                
    
8 Drugs and health includes all patents with an international patent classification in  either  A61 or
A01N.  Jonathan Putnam, Charles Rivers Associates, kindly provided these data.16
exercised by their loss of 'first mover' advantages in U.S. and other foreign generic markets."  In fact,
Indian firms currently have two institutional advantages in trying to enter quickly with low costs.   The
lack of product  patents means  that an  imitating firm can  have many years  of  experience with the
commercial production of an on-patent drug before  the day  that the patent expires  in  the U.S.,  in
Europe  and  elsewhere.  Indian  firms  also benefit  from the  fact that,  in  India,  changes  in  a  drug's
production  process  do  not  require  that it  be  re-approved  for  marketing,  as  is  typically  required
elsewhere.  Thus Indian firms are free to experiment to fine-tune their production processes.
9
That said,  Indian  firms  are  likely  to become  important players  in  this market regardless  of
whether they have a first-mover advantage.  India is a currently positioning to become  a  significant
supplier of bulk drugs to the world.  Many manufacturing  facilities  have been approved by  the U.S.
FDA, the U.K. MCA, and so on.  In generics, low manufacturing costs are essential.  Here labor costs
are India's most obvious advantage, but one Indian firm recently estimated that its capital  costs  were
also 50-75% lower than those in developed countries (Ghemawat and Kothavala, 1996).  Most of the
larger  Indian  firms  have ambitious  plans  to  expand  their  generic  drug  exports,  either  as  suppliers,
through joint venture agreements with foreign firms or by purchasing formulation plants overseas.  For
example, Cipla has formed a subsidiary with a local firm in South Africa to sell Cipla products in that
country,  as  well  as  a  marketing  alliance  with  Novopharm,  Canada  (Cipla,  1996).  Ranbaxy  has
purchased formulation plants in the U.S. and in Ireland, as well as forming a joint venture with Eli Lilly
to market joint products in the U.S.  Lupin has alliances with Merck Generics, U.K., Fujisawa, U.S. and
McGaw  Inc., U.S.,  to market their cephalosporin products.  They have also just established  a  joint
venture in South Africa and are negotiating further alliances in  Russia  and  China.  Forming  alliances
rather than direct marketing is the established route into the international market.  A local presence is
seen to be necessary both to speed marketing approvals and  increase  customer  acceptance of  Indian
made products.
10
                                                
    
9 I was told by an executive at one MNC subsidiary  that in  developed  country markets firms  will
often continue to use an early process in commercial production, even when they know it to be  less
efficient than one discovered later, simply because of the high cost of getting a new process approved.
    
10 On this point, one executive of an Indian firm described a recent consumer opinion survey fielded
in the U.S. which indicated that an Indian made health product was acceptable to the extent that it was
used externally: shampoos  and  cremes  were fine, toothpaste was  more doubtful  and  pharmaceuticals
were  definitely considered suspect.  This bias may carry over to the domestic market.  An executive
from an  Indian  firm told me  that launching  a  new  drug in  India  was  impossible  because  of  Indian
doctors' view that a drug could not be important if it had not appeared in Lancet.  On the other hand, in
another interview I was told of a recent survey which had shown that, given the choice, Indian doctors
prefer to prescribe drugs made by Indian companies--which, it was suggested, might be due to unethical17
MNCs are  also moving  towards  greater  production  of  generics  in  India  through  their  own
subsidiaries or in collaboration with Indian firms.  In 1994 and  1995 there were 50  applications per
year for government approval of collaborations with foreign partners in the field  of  pharmaceuticals
(including the establishment of subsidiaries; Government of India, 1994 and 1995).  These are primarily
to source generic bulk drugs.  Thus, while generic sales may become less profitable for the Indian firms
without the jump on other entrants, it  seems  unlikely  that the introduction of  product  patents will
prevent either Indian firms or India-based MNC subsidiaries from increasing their participation in the
world generics market.
It is not entirely clear what the overall effect of granting product patents will be on the amount
of pharmaceutical production taking place in India.  Currently, over three-quarters of the bulk drugs and
finished formulations consumed in India are produced domestically (see Section II).  Most of these are
off-patent drugs (see Section IV).  There is no reason  to expect that granting  product  patents would
effect  the production of  off-patent drugs  for the domestic  market  one  way  or  the  other  and,  as
discussed above, it is not likely to dampen production for export to the world generics market.
Once  patent  protection  is  available,  however,  patent-owning  firms  may  choose  either  to
export their patented drugs  to India,  thereby replacing  domestic  production, or  they may chose  to
produce  in  India  through  a  subsidiary  or  under  license  to Indian  firms.  An  executive  of  an  MNC
subsidiary suggested in an interview that the MNCs' concern about global price differentials makes local,
low cost, production attractive as a way to justify Indian prices which are lower than those charged in
developed country markets.  On the other hand, the 'transfer pricing loophole' discussed in Section IV
would give patent-owning MNCs an incentive to produce bulk drug inputs  elsewhere  and  then import
them into India.  Another executive of an MNC subsidiary pointed out that, while the availability  of
strong intellectual property protection was necessary, other considerations, like tax advantages, were at
least as important in choosing a manufacturing location for on-patent drugs.
11  Further, he noted that,
unlike generic drugs, manufacturing costs are  a  small  component of  the price of  patented drugs  and
therefore India's advantages as a low-cost manufacturer would not be  particularly useful  in  attracting
                                                                                                                                                            
detailing.
    
11 It is not entirely obvious why MNCs have not invested in Indian manufacturing of their on-patent
drugs  since,  regardless,  the drugs  are  imitated  by  local  firms.  When posed  this question,  the  same
executive stated there was 'always something to lose', particularly through employee job switching.18
investment in local production facilities.  So, while the largest part of pharmaceutical production should
be unaffected, it seems likely that some part of the local production of on-patent drugs will be replaced
by imports.
Since 1988-89 the pharmaceutical sector has made a positive contribution to India's balance of
payments. (See Table  5  for trade details.)  With the introduction of  product  patents, the resulting
transfer of profit from domestic to foreign patent owners, via royalty payments or export profits on
drugs sold to Indian consumers, will have an adverse effect on India's balance of payments.  So, too, will
the fact that Indian firms will no longer be able to export on-patent drugs to other countries, primarily
in  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  in  Africa,  which,  until  now,  also  did  not  offer  protection  for
pharmaceutical products.  The latter effect is likely to be small, however.  Comparing Table 6, which
shows exports of major on-patent drugs, to Table 5 it is clear that on-patent drugs   are  only a small
part of total exports by value.  One can see too, in Table 5, that most of the growth in exports has
been  in  bulk  drugs,  which  are  likely  to  have been  headed  to  the  West,  rather  than  in  finished
formulations.  The  current  and  growing  importance  of  generics  in  exports  suggests  that  the
introduction of product patents will not have a dramatic negative effect on the balance of payments,
such as that experienced by Italy where the net pharmaceutical exports as a share of total trade fell by
about 30 percent in the decade after product patents were introduced (Scherer and Weisbrot, 1995).
VI. Evidence: Administration and Enforcement
In  the developed  countries,  the resource  cost in  terms of  skilled  labor  required  to  run  and
enforce a patent system  is  given  little  thought.  However,  patent examiners, to take one example,
typically have advanced  degrees  and  work  experience  in  the  relevant  sciences.  In  the  countries
strengthening their patent systems now, nationals with such qualifications are  scarce,  in  high demand
from industry, and consequently patent offices will either be under (or inappropriately) staffed or they
will be very costly to run.  For the year 1993-94, the Indian  PTO cost the government about  330
thousand dollars (net of receipts; Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, 1996).  By
contrast, in the late 1980s the U.S. PTO was spending about 300 million dollars per year.  Although
one would not expect the Indian  system  be  as  costly  as  that in  the U.S. (but note that India  has  a
population roughly four times greater), improving the facilities and staff so that it can effectively deal
with the coming expansion in the size and  importance of  the intellectual property rights  system  is19
certain to be expensive.
There is also a shortage of the complementary skills outside of the patent office  required  to
maintain an effective patent system.  In 1995 there were only 151 patent agents in the entire country
(Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 1996).  Because relatively few  patents are
filed, there is little experience with writing specifications, detecting loopholes in others' patents, and so
on.  According to a Delhi patent attorney, in the past two decades there have been just four or  five
patent infringement cases filed per year, so there is little local legal experience with patent litigation.
12
 The types of problems encountered in a country inexperienced with intellectual property go further. 
He related a story of an early copyright infringement case,  where  the police  stapled  confiscated  CD
Roms into a notebook, thus destroying the evidence.
In recognition of the current shortage of  awareness  and  skills  needed  to maintain and  use  a
patent system, some training has begun.  The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has
held more than 50 seminars across the country to increase understanding of intellectual property.  A.K.
Reddy, Chairman of Reddy's Group, has donated land to establish  a  National Institute of  Intellectual
Property.  A primary goal of the institute would be to train patent agents.
In discussions with people in the country involved with the patent system one becomes aware
of the large range of expertise--within companies, among lawyers, the courts, the police, and so on--
required  to  make a  patent  system  work.  Again,  developing  and  using  these  human  resources  is
expensive, and will be  particularly so  if  strengthening the system  leads  to a rash of  litigation.  Of
course, not all of the anticipated increase in administration and enforcement costs can be laid at  the
feet of  pharmaceutical product  patents, since  changes  in  the IPR  system  will  be  more extensive. 
However, if the U.S. experience is anything to go by, most litigation can be expected over patents in
this area (Lanjouw  and Schankerman, 1997).
VII. Evidence: Diffusion
                                                
    
12  This does not, of  course,  mean that there is  little  infringement.  With a  short  patent  term,
compulsory licensing with a royalty cap of 4%, and no reversal of the burden of proof, there has been
little payoff to prosecuting infringements.  According to an Indian patent attorney, patentees usually
do better than the 4% royalty by settling disputes outside of court.20
It was pointed out in Section III that the dynamic benefit of new innovation comes only after
two steps: discovery and diffusion.  One part of diffusion is moving a new pharmaceutical product from
the laboratory to the market.  This process includes adapting the product to local conditions, obtaining
marketing approval, and introducing it to doctors and others in the distribution chain.
13 Diffusion  also
 includes the spread of information about new discoveries to other firms, so that the information can
become an input into their own research and development.  In this section we consider what empirical
evidence can say now about the effect that introducing product patents might have on the rate of the
diffusion of pharmaceutical innovations to India, as information to firms and as new products to Indian
consumers.
One of the original arguments for having a patent system  was  that, in  return  for monopoly
rights received from the government, the inventor disclosed his innovation in the patent specification.
 This was seen as an important mechanism for diffusing information so that others could build upon it
and to avoid the replication of research efforts.  While this argument makes  sense  in  a  one-country
world, or, as in history, a multi-country world where communication links are poor, it does not carry
through  to  the  group  of  countries  introducing  produce  patents  today.  The  bulk  of  significant
innovations  are  patented  internationally  and  Indian  firms  are  easily  able  to  access  world  patent
specifications.  Interviews with the major Indian firms indicated that all of them had this capacity in-
house,  through  computerized  databases  and  the  internet,  and  none  considered  access  to  frontier
technical information a difficulty.  For  small  and  medium-sized  firms,  the Indian  PTO  operates  a
computerized patent search facility in the city of Nagper  with access to patent specifications from all
countries.  They will perform searches and send copies of specifications for a low fee.  Thus, there is, if
anything, a negligible gain in additional information disclosure to be expected by the country’s granting
of  new patent rights.
Will granting product patents speed the arrival of new drug discoveries to the shelves of Indian
pharmacies?  This depends  on  how  quickly  new  drugs  are  arriving  now, in  the  absence  of  product
patents, and whether patentee control will speed  or  slow this arrival.  Table  4  shows  the on-patent
drugs in the top 500 brands sold in India in June of 1993.  The second column shows the year of first
introduction somewhere  in  the world  and  the third column  shows  the  year in  which  the  drug  was
                                                
    
13 As one Indian R&D manager pointed out, the local conditions include climatic variation from the
tropics to snowy mountains with unpredictable transport conditions and long shelve-life requirements. 
Ensuring stability is one of the foremost concerns in product development for the Indian market.21
approved for marketing in  India  by  the Drugs  Controller General  or,  in  a  few  cases,  the  year of
introduction by an Indian firm.  The forth column gives the introduction lag.  With the exception of
Cefaclor  (and see  below  for a discussion  of  this case),  for  drugs  where  both dates  are  known  the
introduction lag was typically four or five years.  Since  the process of  clinical  testing  and  obtaining
marketing approval takes about  three years  for the first applicant in  India  (estimated by  the Drugs
Controller General) and since executives of Indian firms stated in interviews that they usually waited to
see  the  extent  of  a  new  drug's  acceptance  internationally  before  investing  heavily  in  process
development, this implies  very quick  imitation by  Indian  firms.  The  managing  director  of  Glaxo
(India)  Ltd., noted that they had  tried  to be  first into the Indian  market  with  their  patented  drug
Ranatidine (Zantac), but were met with seven Indian competitors at the time of launch.  Whether the
speed of imitation in recent years can  be  extrapolated into the future,  when more difficult  to copy
biotechnology-based drugs become increasingly important, is, of course, again an open question.
Table 4 indicates the introduction lags for drugs which were, eventually, launched in India.   In a
presentation in India, one MNC representative suggested that product patents will increase the access
of Indian consumers to new drugs by pointing to the fact that many 'important drug therapies' had not
been introduced in India at all.  However, to put  this in  context, consider  again  the study  by  Barral
(1990) of NCEs introduced anywhere in the world from 1975 through 1989.  As noted above, his group
of experts classified 95 of these 775 NCEs as therapeutically innovative.  Among the innovative drugs,
as of 1990, 31% were being marketed in fewer than six of the seven largest pharmaceutical markets.
14 
In other words,  even restricting attention to new  drugs  deemed  to offer a therapeutic advantage,  a
significant portion were not introduced by the patentee in developed country markets that did  grant
product patents.
It is likely that failures to launch in India are for quite different reasons  than the absence  of
product patents.  One is administrative.  The inventor, or an imitating Indian firm, may have tried to
introduce the product but failed to obtain marketing approval.  In India, by law firms are  required  to
show only the safety and efficacy of new drugs in order to obtain marketing approval from the Drugs
Controller General (as in the U.S.).  However, according to the Drugs  Controller General  himself,  in
practice they are often also required to show utility, that is, that the new drug is needed.  One company
interviewee involved in this process from the industry  side also asserted  that this was  often required
                                                
    
14 Clearly truncation could be part of the story.  Some of these may have ended  up  being  globally
launched after 1990.  However, truncation would only affect a few of the more recent NCEs.22
and, further, that new drug applications were frequently rejected by the government on this basis.  If
this is the main explanation then changes in intellectual property laws will have little impact.
Another  explanation  lies  in  possible  hesitation  on  the  part  of  patent-owning  MNCs  in
launching  their patented drugs  themselves, because  of  their concern about  global  reference pricing. 
This was brought up repeatedly in interviews with executives of MNC subsidiaries as an explanation for
decisions either to delay launches or to never launch their patented pharmaceuticals in India.  This is
apparently a  particularly  important  issue  for  American  firms,  but  most European  firms  also  pay
attention  to  global  price  differentials  (the  pricing  freedom  given  to  Glaxo's  Indian  subsidiary,
demonstrated in  its  race to enter the market with Ranatidine,  seems  to be  a  rare exception).  For
example, Bayer chose not to introduce its patented drug ciprofloxacin in India because it  would  have
had to sell it at what Bayer viewed as, at that time, too low  of  a  price.  Instead,  ciprofloxacin was
introduced three years  after its  world  launch  by  the Indian  firm Ranbaxy  (interviews  and  Clippings,
7/93).
15
Will this issue cause problems for India once inventors are granted monopoly control over the
introduction of new products?  More than seven years after its world introduction and  long after the
entrance of a multitude of local producers, Bayer also began marketing ciprofloxacin in India, at a price
about  a  tenth of  that in  the  U.S.  (interview).  Since  regulatory  attention  to  prices  in  developed
countries is paid primarily at the time that drugs are  initially  introduced,  it  appears  that global  price
differences become less important over time.  Also, like a  threat of  non-supply in  the face of  price
regulation,  a  failure  to  introduce  could  be  combated  with  compulsory  licensing  (see  Section  IV). 
Nevertheless, these remedies do not operate immediately.  A tendency on the part of patent-owning
MNCs to delay the introduction of their innovative drugs in India could mean that, in the future, new
drug therapies become available to Indian consumers more slowly than they would have if the current
regime, which allows imitation, had been retained.
VIII. Evidence: Research and Development
In thinking about the possible effects of the introduction of product patents on investment in
                                                
    
15  Danzon (1997) reports that Glaxo did not launch Imigram for several years after obtaining
marketing approval in France because the government insisted on a low price.23
R&D, there are  three  separate  issues.  First  is  the  effect  of  the  incremental  returns  received  by
inventors as a result of these new rights on the incentive to invest in research on projects which are
aimed at a global market.  Second is the effect on incentives to invest in projects of particular interest
to India.  And finally there is the effect of granting product patents on the amount of pharmaceutical
R&D that takes place in India, either within government or academic institutions, MNC subsidiaries or
domestic firms.
Since it is difficult to anticipate the size of the profits which will be obtained by patentees as a
result of product patents (see Section IV on price changes and Section V on the distribution of profit)
and since we do not know very much about the elasticity of R&D investment in response to increased
returns, it is difficult to guess whether the first effect will be significant.  Given the enormous disparity
in mean incomes between the developed countries and the LDCs, and  given  the small  proportion of
higher-income households within the LDCs, the contribution of profits coming from the LDC markets
will probably be initially a quite small addition to total global profits (as suggested in Figure A).  Table 7
shows that expenditure per capita in India compared to a range of other countries is extremely low. 
However, this may be set to change.  India has a huge population and even with very low expenditures
per capita was already, in 1995, the 12th largest pharmaceuticals market in  the world.  (And this is
with, it is claimed, only 30% of the population consuming allopathic medicines.)  A possible loosening
of restrictions on the insurance market is under  discussion  in  the government and  private insurance
may be available in the next few years.  One  Indian  executive  said that his  firm had  an  agreement
already  set  up  with an  American  insurance  company interested in  entering  the  Indian  market  and
suggested  that another  Indian  firm had  a  similar  arrangement  with  a  second  American  insurance
company.  Given the low starting level, there is much scope for increased pharmaceutical consumption
in  India  as  incomes  grow and  medical  insurance  becomes  more prevalent.  Thus, with  a  long  time
horizon, it might be the case that the introduction of product patent protection in India will have more
than a negligible impact on new drug discovery.
It is possible to be more optimistic on the second point.  The demand patterns of consumers in
the group of countries now introducing product patents are quite different from those of the developed
countries.  For drug therapies relevant to LDCs, the incremental incentive generated by product patents
may be  significant  even in  the short run.   There are  two  senses  in  which  a  drug  therapy  may  be
particularly relevant to India and to the LDCs as a group.  First, disease patterns are quite different. 
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Table 8 shows the diseases for which 99% or more of the global burden is in low- and middle-income
countries (where burden is defined as the number of disability adjusted life years, or DALYs, lost to the
disease.  This includes  years  lived  with disabilities  as  well as  premature mortality.)   Although  India
shares the diseases important in developed countries, and will increasingly as the population grows more
wealthy,  vast numbers  of  Indians  also suffer  from diseases,  such as  malaria  and  leprosy,  which  the
developed world is largely free of.
16  Another sense in which particular therapies can be relevant is in
the cost/efficiency tradeoff.  Even within  disease  categories  which  are  also of  interest to developed
countries,  drug discoveries  which  have the potential to be  very cost effective but  not  as  effective
overall may not be acceptable in those markets and hence not developed and  commercialized in  the
present environment.
Currently almost all  research  on  drugs  for diseases  prevalent in  the LDCs is  done either  by
internationally-funded organizations or the military in the developed countries and it is a  very small
part of world pharmaceutical R&D investment.  For example, of the 56 billion dollars spent on health-
related R&D worldwide, only 0.2% is on pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases and TB, diseases which between
them represent 18% of  the global  disease  burden  (WHO, 1996).  In  Barral's  (1990) study  of  NCEs
marketed commercially in the seven major industrialized markets between 1975 and 1989, only eight
of 775 were specific to tropical diseases, and two of these were discovered in U.S. army laboratories. 
By contrast, the UNDP/World Bank/WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical
Diseases has developed 78 products in the past 19 years, 24 of which are already in use and of which
another 35 are in clinical or field trials (Scrips, 1995).  Although purchasing power in India,  and  the
other LDCs, is low, the sheer size of this potential market may, once patent protection is  available,
make investing in drug discovery projects with primary markets in the LDCs sufficiently profitable that
private firms become interested.
The example of orphan drugs may be instructive.  In the early 1980s there was discussion in the
U.S. about the problem of drugs which had been discovered but were not being developed and marketed
by firms because they were useful only to a small population of sufferers.  They were termed orphans
because of the discoverers' lack of interest in these unprofitable drug candidates.   In  1983, a bill was
passed which offered firms seven years of market exclusivity for drugs with a potential market of fewer
                                                
    
16 Even within diseases there can be differences in incidence.  For example, AIDs cases in developing
countries are the result of HIV which is  a  subtype  different than the subtype  common in  the West
which is the subject of vast amounts of R&D spending (WHO, 1996).25
than 200,000 patients, even when a patent would otherwise  not be  available,  as  well as  subsidies  for
testing.  Although there is room for abusing this policy by carefully designing target populations so as
to classify a drug as an orphan, there is no doubt that this legislation lead to a surge in investment in
drugs which were legitimate orphans and which would not have been developed otherwise.  In the decade
before 1983 there were ten drugs  for rare diseases  approved by  the U.S  FDA.   In  the decade  after
passage of the Orphan Drug Act, 99  such drugs  were approved, and  189 were reported to be  under
clinical testing in 1992 (BCG, 1996).
Perhaps the most difficult question is the last.  Will the introduction of product patents lead to
more R&D  being  done in  India?  For  MNCs,  strong  intellectual property laws are  certainly a  pre-
requisite for the choice to locate pharmaceutical R&D facilities in a country.   A survey of U.S. firms
conducted  by  Edwin  Mansfield  found  that IPRs are  very important to  pharmaceutical MNCs  when
making  decisions  about  R&D  locations, less so  for finishing  generic  drugs  (United  Nations, 1993). 
Currently, India  fails  on  this count.   India  was  the  country  most frequently  cited  by  corporate
respondants as  having  intellectual property laws too weak  to  permit  investment  in  the  chemicals
(including pharmaceuticals) sector (Mansfield, 1994).  In recent years, Hoechst has been the only MNC
with a  subsidiary  doing  basic  research  in  India  (with  a  focus  on  natural  products).  The  only other
example is Ciba-Geigy, which had a basic R&D facility located in India from 1963-1989.  That said,
even more than in the case of  manufacturing  facilities,  granting  and  enforcing  intellectual property
rights is likely to be far from sufficient to attract MNC investment.  R&D tends to be quite centralized.
 For example, Pfizer has R&D centers outside of the U.S. in only four, developed, countries--the U.K.,
France, Germany and Japan--compared to manufacturing plants  in  65  countries,  of  which  21  are  in
LDCs (Santoro, 1995).
It is  frequently  argued  by  proponents  of  the  TRIPs  accord  that India,  once new,  WTO-
consistent, intellectual property laws are in place, will be very attractive as a location for R&D because,
by locating in India, firms can take advantage of a sizable pool of low-cost and technically skilled labor
to escape  part of  the great expense  of  drug discovery  and  development.  They point to the rapid
growth in the Indian software industry, centered in the city of Bangalore, where a very large number of
MNCs have located part of their software development.   However, a head office R&D executive from
a pharmaceutical MNC  emphasized  in  an  interview  that cost is  not  a  main consideration  in  their
location decisions, even for development research.  Further, it is not even clear that real costs are that
much lower in India.  Interviewees said that although customs restrictions on the import of equipment
had been eased in recent years, this still posed a problem.  A manager at one firm noted that they have26
an employee permanently stationed at the Bombay port to deal with 'time-sensitive' imports such as
mice.  While much of the equipment  in  R&D  labs is  now  available  from Indian  suppliers,  precision
equipment  is  still  imported and  the difficulty  and  time necessary  to obtain  parts  and  servicing  on
foreign-made  equipment  was  claimed  by  one interviewee  as  their biggest  disadvantage  in  running  a
research lab.  Even labor, while cheaper than in the West, does not appear greatly so.  In one interview,
a scientist just returning from graduate school and then five years at one of the U.S. National Institutes
of Health, when asked about relative salaries, said that starting salaries were quite different: $4,500 in
India against $35-40,000 for a comparably skilled  person  in  the U.S.   His  own  salary,  however,  he
judged  to be  at least  a  quarter  of  the salary  of  someone  at a comparable  level  in  the U.S.   In  an
interview at another Indian firm the same story emerged.  Starting salaries for research scientists were
judged to be about 20% of those in the U.S.,  but  approaching 50%  at higher  levels.  In  many firm
interviews it was also noted that salaries for researchers are increasing  quickly.  Taken together, the
fact that costs are not their prime concern and the fact that the cost of doing R&D in India does not
actually appear to be dramatically lower than elsewhere suggest that there is no reason to expect that
the introduction  of  product  patents  will  encourage  MNCs  to  locate  R&D  facilities  for  discovery
research in India.
On the other hand, the story may well be different for Indian firms.  In a paper which considers
the likely response of Indian firms to obtaining the ability to purchase  foreign  technologies, Fikkert
(1994) estimates that domestic R&D efforts would decline, but to very modest degree.  In line with the
efficency gains  to be  expected  from licensing,  he  estimates that the switch  to  greater  reliance  on
purchased technologies would be associated with a large increase in the productivity of domestic firms.
Looking at the domestic pharmaceutical sector today,  a  handful  of  firms  have already  begun
increasing their total investment in R&D (from about 1-2% of sales to 5-6% of sales in the past few
years). More significantly, some of them are beginning to allocate  a  part of  that investment to the
search for new molecules rather than imitative process development research.  And there are signs that
they will be successful in this new direction.  As discussed in the previous section, the Indian firms have
already  demonstrated  great  expertise  at  rapidly  devising  new  processes  for  patent  products.  A
particularly dramatic example is Ranbaxy's  development in  1991, after 20  million  dollars  and  three
years of effort, of a new process for producing Eli Lilly's patented drug cefaclor.   In the words  of  a
Ranbaxy executive, "56 processes were under patent (with Lilly) and we found the 57th" (interview). 
Since Eli Lilly's product patent for cefaclor expired in 1992 and the firm was expecting to protect its
monopoly with process patents which  were due  to expire  only in  1994, this gave great scope  for a27
mutually  advantageous  agreement between  the two  companies.
17  A series  of  50:50  joint  ventures
followed in the wake of Eli Lilly's recognition of Ranbaxy's superior research capabilities.
This was, of course, an example of  process  development.  A few  companies  have also been
successful  in  discovering  new  products.  For  example,  Reddy's  Research  Foundation,  a  separately
constituted research center established in 1992 which is part of Dr. Reddy's Group, only works on the
discovery of new molecules.  In June of 1995 they filed their first two product applications in the U.S.
(anti-cancer and  anti-diabetes  substances)  and  now  have ten more patent applications in  developed
countries.  Dabur also has a self-standing research foundation which is 50% devoted to doing discovery
research related to anti-cancer drugs.  To date they have submitted two patent applications in the U.S.
and two more in the U.K. (interviews).
An important aspect of the R&D being done by MNC subsidiaries and Indian firms in India is
the extent of sub-contracting.  Discovering a new molecule and bringing it to market involves  many
stages.  Sub-contracting allows firms to focus initially on the parts of the process in which they have
gained a comparative advantage.   Organizing  R&D  through  networks  of  research  collaborations and
joint ventures is becoming increasingly common with the advent of biotechnology firms.  Commonly,
biotechnology firms  supply  ideas,  compounds,  therapies, and  applied  research  outcomes, while  large
pharmaceutical partners supply  complementary research  capabilities  (where  economies  of  scale  are
important), large-scale  development and  marketing.  (See  Gambardella,  1995,  for  examples  of  the
complexity of these networks.)  Most of the Indian subsidiaries of foreign MNCs interviewed said that
they did some, and expected to do more, development work for their home offices.  Several were very
close  to  having  their  clinical  testing  results  approved  by  the  home office  for  use  in  U.S.  FDA
submissions.  Recently, Hoffman-La Roche and Smithkline Beecham  have sought  approval from the
Indian  government to establish  wholly-owned  subsidiaries  for  R&D  projects,  in  the  latter  case  to
develop new and existing Beecham vaccines (Government of India, 1994a and 1995).
For an Indian firm taking the first steps towards new molecule discovery, the ability to lower
costs by sub-contracting or by joining up with foreign firms in research joint ventures,  is  particularly
                                                
    
17 The magnitude of this achievement is brought out by this comment made by Eli Lilly’s
Pharmaceuticals President in February 1991, emphazing the protection offered by a difficult
production process and a patent on a late stage intermediate: ”when all factors are considered Ceclor
(cefaclor) should ‘remain a viable product for Eli Lilly beyond expiration of the patent’”.  And the
Research  Labs President: “‘The Ceclor synthetic route is so long and so complex’ that it will be
difficult to duplicate....’a legal end-run seems extremely improbable.’” (quoted in OTA, 1993).28
important.  A surprising array of agreements have already been made.  For example,  Wockhardt just
established  a  joint  venture  with  Rhein  Biotech  GmbH,  Germany,  to  do  research  in  India  on
biotechnology products.  One  of  Ranbaxy's  joint ventures  with Eli  Lilly  will be  based  in  India  and
involved in development work..  Cipla undertakes custom synthesis under secrecy agreements.  Dabur is
in  discussions  with a  U.K. company about  doing  development work  for  them.  Two  of  the  firms
involved in discovery research send compounds  to Daiichi,  Japan,  for screening.  Compounds  which
look promising are pursued by the Indian firm and may result in a joint patent.  In an interesting twist,
Reddy's  Research  Foundation  has  an  arrangement  with  a  Swiss  firm whereby  Reddy's  sends  them
interesting compounds which the Swiss firm then develops.
What is not obvious is what the importance of Indian product patents will be  in  encouraging
this process, given that product patents are already available to Indian inventors in much of the rest of
the world.  The cooperative R&D arrangements described above were made between Indian and foreign
firms without product patents being available  in  India.  Scherer  and  Weisbrot  (1994) point out  that
Switzerland was a leading originator of important new drugs even in the period before it began granting
product patents.  Interviewed executives of R&D intensive Indian firms were all very clear that their
target market for new drug discovery research is one hundred percent global.  They are concentrating
their efforts on drugs for important developed country diseases, such as cancer and diabetes, where U.S.
FDA  marketing approval is  quick  and  even a moderately important  discovery  is  likely  to  have a
significant payoff.
The availability of patents in India may be important for encouraging innovation by  smaller
Indian firms and may facilitate contracting in the development of products for the local market.  The
advantage is that it will allow a firm to obtain a priority date with an Indian patent application at a cost
far below a foreign application: $300-400 in India versus about $6,000 for a U.S. patent (interviews).  
A government official in the Dept of Biotechnology (DoB) described how the department had helped
researchers apply for foreign patents (four thus far), in order to help them overcome the cost hurdle. 
He noted, however, that for products with a more limited local market, where a foreign  patent would
not be useful, the lack of patent protection in India was a stumbling block  in  getting  innovations to
market.  Companies interested in commercializing DoB  innovations were held back because,  without
patents, the DoB could not guarantee them exclusivity (Ghosh, 1996).
In the end, however, perhaps the main reason for thinking that the introduction of  product
patents in India will increase the amount of innovative R&D done by Indian firms has nothing to do29
with the traditional  explanation  based  on  enhanced  returns.  It  is  simply  that they will  soon be
prevented from following a strategy which has been profitable, imitation, and must switch to something
else in order to grow.
IX.  Concluding Comments
It is too soon to draw any strong conclusions about what the effects will be of India’s upcoming
introduction of  product  patents for pharmaceuticals.  In  answer  to the question  posed  in  the title:
“exploitation of the poor?” the answer is probably no--if nothing else because the “poor” in India are
too poor to consume  pharmaceuticals,  even under  the current  regime.  For  the 70%  or  so  of  the
population  who  currently  does  not  have  access  to  pharmaceuticals,  the  introduction  of  patent
protection, and any price effects that may follow, are irrelevant.   We have also seen that, of the drugs
currently on the market, just under ten percent are on-patent in Europe.  Extrapolating this percentage
into the  future,  which  may  itself  be  questionable,  means  that  even  if  product  patents  result  in
significantly higher prices, much of the pharmaceutical market will not be affected.
Considering only the part of the market which will be affected by the new regime, there are a
number of reasons for thinking that the low  incomes  of  India’s  consumers  and  the lack of  medical
insurance will not ensure low prices, as is  sometimes  suggested.   Firstly,  the latter two  features  are
likely to begin to change in the next decade.  Historical and cross-country evidence also does not give
confidence that this will be the case.    And, perhaps most importantly, patent-owning firms may not
be setting prices to maximize profits in  the Indian  market.  They maximize  global  profits, and  the
politics of drug price regulation may dictate a limit to how low they will be willing to set prices in India.
  Price control may also be ineffective in keeping down prices, since patent protection in combination
with both the transfer-price loophole and  a  possible  threat to not supply  give firms  non-negligible
power  in bargaining with the government over the price of patented drugs.  Whatever eventuates, the
fact that the industry is very competitive today means that any monopoly profits obtained by patent-
owning firms once product patents become available can, with reasonable confidence, be  attributed  to
the change in IPR regime.
Indian  firms  are  moving  into the world  generics  market  and,  although  the  introduction  of
product patents will cause them to lose their first-mover advantage, their low manufacturing costs will
continue to give them an  advantage  in  competing for this market.  It may become  somewhat  less30
profitable, since speed into the market seems to be important, but there does not seem to be any reason
to expect that they will not be successful in increasing their participation in the generics sector.  The
bulk of production for the domestic market is drugs which are not on-patent.  As a result of these two
features, the introduction of product patents should not have a strong adverse affect on employment in
the industry or on the contribution of the pharmaceutical sector to the balance of payments.
The positive contribution of intellectual property comes in its dynamic effect on the creation
and diffusion of knowledge.   Considering first the diffusion of information, it appears that Indian firms
are well able to access and information disclosed in patent specifications filed elsewhere.   Since most
important pharmaceutical innovations will be patented internationally, there is likely to be little or no
additional benefit to be gained by Indians from specifications being filed domestically.   In the case of
diffusion  of  products  into the market, granting  protection may speed  diffusion,  for  the  traditional
reason that having a monopoly position makes the process of adapting  a  product,  getting  marketing
approval, and introducing it to consumers profitable.  However, there are  also reasons  to think that
giving patentees control over introductions may slow down diffusion.   Currently Indian firms are quite
quick to bring imitations to the market.   An MNC with a new patented drug may  delay  a  launch  in
India  because  of  the concern over global  price regulations  noted above.   If,  for  this reason,  they
hesitate to introduce  a  drug at a low  price in  the initial  years  of  global  marketing,  with  imitators
prevented from entering  because  of  the  new  patent  law,  innovative  pharmaceuticals  may  actually
become available to Indian consumers more slowly.
Finally, there are several issues regarding the effect of product patents on discovery research. 
It seems unlikely that, at the current levels of income in India,  the profits to be made from having 
monopoly rights in that country will add substantially to the profits already available in the world for
drugs which are of  global interest.  However,  as  discussed  in  the paper,  very little  R&D  is  done to
develop drug therapies for the set of diseases which are relevant to Indian consumers but which are not
important to consumers  in  developed  countries.   Almost  all  of  it  is  done  by  government-funded
development institutions or by the military.  For  these drugs, the introduction of product patents in
India could create a substantial incremental increase in profits and encourage more commercial interest
in their discovery and development. 
The final question was  whether  the introduction of  product  patents will contribute to more
R&D  being  done in  India.  Although  strong  intellectual property rights  are  important to MNCs in
deciding where to locate R&D facilities, given the centralized nature of R&D and fact that costs are not31
the paramount concern there does not seem to be any compelling reason for them to locate in India
even after product patents are available.   Further, a number of  MNCs are already increasing their use
of local subsidiaries to do development work.  Although stronger intellectual property rights may make
the Indian environment more appealing to MNCs as a location for R&D, it  is  unlikely  that product
patents will make a dramatic difference to their choices.
There is more reason to think that the upcoming introduction of product patents will make a
difference to the amount and type of R&D being done by Indian firms.  Already the larger  firms  are
increasing their total R&D expenditure as a percentage of sales and they are beginning to move in the
direction of new molecule discovery rather then concentrating solely on development research.   Given
that there is already patent protection available to Indian inventors in the rest of the world, if there is
a role for Indian product patents in encouraging this process it is not in the incentive effect, but rather
the fact that the strategy of  imitation is  being  closed  off.  While some  firms  may  not  make the
transition, signs thus far suggest that a number of Indian firms will successfully weather the transition
and come out as more innovative companies.32
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Table 1
Top 20 Firms by Pharmaceutical Sales
1996 versus 1971
Rank  Company - 1996
1996 Sales
(Billion Rupees)  Company - 1971
  1  Glaxo-Wellcome   4.97  Sarabhai
*
  2  Cipla
*   2.98  Glaxo
  3  Ranbaxy
*   2.67  Pfizer
  4  Hoechts-Roussel   2.60  Alembic
*
  5  Knoll Pharmaceutical   1.76  Hoechst
  6  Pfizer   1.73  Lederle
  7  Alembic
*   1.68  Ciba
  8  Torrent Pharma
*   1.60  May & Baker
  9  Lupin Labs
*   1.56  Parke Davis
 10  Zydus-Cadila
*   1.51  Abbott
 11  Ambalal Sarabhai
*   1.38  Sharp & Dome
 12  Smithkline Beecham   1.20  Sudrid Geigy
 13  Aristo Pharma
*   1.17  Unichem Labs
*
 14  Parke Davis   1.15  East India
*
 15  Cadila Pharma
*   1.12  Sandoz
 16  E. Merck   1.11  Deys
*
 17  Wockhardt
*   1.08  Boots
 18  John Wyeth   1.04  T.C.F
*.
 19  Alkem Laboratories
*   1.04  Warner Hindu
 20  Hindustan Ciba Geigy
*  
  1.03  John Wyeth
 Note: * indicates an Indian firm.
 Source: ORG, Bombay.37
Table 2






Pakistan The U.K The U.S.
Ranitidine 300 tabs/10
pack
 18.53  14.1  26.1  56.7
Famotidine 40 tabs/10
pack
 18.61  14.0  27.1  54.0
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg/4
pack
 28.40   8.3  10.3  15.4
Norfloxacin 400 mg/10
pack
 39.00   3.2   6.5  23.2
Source: Keayla (1996), referencing U.S. Red Book 1995; U.K. MIMS, 1995; India MIMS, 1995; and
Pakistan QIMP Annual 1991-92.38
Table 3
Percentage of Sales to Drugs under Patent in the U.K. as of 1993
By Therapy Group
 Theraputic Group  Percentage of Sales to On-Patent Drugs
 Antipeptic Ulcerants  84.0%
 Antiemetic, Antinauseants  19.7
 Myocardial Therapy   0.7
 Hypotensives  89.6
 Antifungals, Dermatologicals  14.5
 Other Dermatological Preparations  20.3
 Oxytocics   0.0
 Ampicillin/Amoxycillin   0.1
 Macrolides & Similar Types   3.2
 Cephalosporins  18.4
 All Other Antibiotics   8.4
 Quinolones  91.3
 Muscle Relaxants   2.5
 Non-Narcotics & Antipyretics   3.6
 Antidepressants Thymoanaleptics  13.1
 Anthelmintics Ex Schis  30.5
 Antihistamines, Systemic  13.5
 Opthal Oto Comb - Anti-infectives  39.4
 Other Opthalmological   1.6
 Source: OPPI 199439
Table 4
Introduction of On-Patent Drugs












Cefuroxime Sodium 1978 < 1988 < 10 1994
Cefaclor 1979   1991   12 1994
Netimicin 1980 < 1988 < 8 1994
Albedazole < 1988 1995
Fluoxetine   1990 1995
Aciclovir 1981   1988   7 1995
Doperidone < 1988 1996
Ranitidine 1981   1985
*   4 1997
Cefotaxime Sodium 1980 < 1988 < 8 1997
Cefuroxime Axetil 1988   1990   2 1997
Ketorolac   1992 1997
Cefotaxime 1980 < 1988 < 8 1997
Captopril 1980   1985
*   5 1997
Norfloxacin 1984
*   1988
*   4 1998
Pefloxacin   1991 1998
Ketoconazole 1981 < 1988 < 7 1998
Famotidine 1984   1989   5 1999
Enalapril Maleate 1984   1989   5 1999
Omeprazole   1991 1999
Astemizole 1983   1988   5 1999
Ceftazidime 1983   1988   5 2000
Ciprofloxacin 1986   1989   3 2001
Ofloxacin   1990 2001
Roxithromycin   1992 2001
Sources: Top 500 on-patent drugs and year of European patent expiry, Redwood (1994); Year of world introduction, either Barral (1990) or, if
starred, year of first introduction by inventor, Keayla (1996); Year of Indian marketing approval, either IDMA (1997) or, if starred, year of
introduction by Indian firm, Keayla (1996).40
Table 5
Production, Exports and Imports
Bulk Drugs and Formulations
(Billions of Rupees)
Year
 Bulk Drugs  Formulations  Total
Prod'n Exports
Imports
(landed) Prod'n Exports Imports Exports Imports
1980-81    0.76     1.13
1985-86    1.94     2.67
1990-91   7.30   1.58   6.70   38.40   6.85   0.85    8.43     7.55
1991-92   9.00   8.39   9.50   48.00   5.09   0.96   13.48    10.46
1992-93  11.50   4.09  10.00   60.00   9.65   1.19   13.74    11.19
1993-94  13.20   5.31  11.46   69.00  13.11   1.13   18.42    12.76
1994-95  15.18   8.43  13.54   79.35  13.36   1.73   21.79    15.27
1995-96   31.17  > 18.67
2000-01  45.33  27.32  32.86  183.54  19.95   n.a.  47.27  > 32.86
Sources: IDMA (1997);  Projections from the Report of the Working Group on Drugs and Pharmaceuticals for the 9th
Five Year Plan.; * provisional value from Chemexcil (interview).41
Table 6
Exports of Three Major Drugs On-Patent in Europe
(Millions of Rupees)
Drug Name
















Ranatidine -      






























































 Total    405.3    806.7
 Note: 1) Includes destinations representing 5% or more of total exports of the indicated drug.
 Sources: Chemexcil (1995) and interviews.42
Table 7
Annual Drug Expenditure Per Capita - 1990
 Country   Expenditure (U.S. Dollars)
 Japan  412
 Germany  222
 United States  191
 Canada  124
 United Kingdom   97
 Norway   89
 Costa Rica   37
 Chile   30
 Mexico   28
 Turkey   21
 Morocco   17
 Brazil   16
 Philippines   11
 Ghana   10
 China    7
 Pakistan    7
 Indonesia    5
 Kenya    4
 India    3
 Bangladesh    2
 Mozambique    2
 Source: OPPI (1994)43
Table 8
Diseases for Which 99% or More of the Global Burden
Falls on Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1990
Disease [Number of Suffers - 1990]
 Developing Country Burden
 as a % of Total
 Chagas Disease [16 million]  100.0%
 Dengue  100.0
 Ancylostomiasis and Necatoriasis  100.0
 Japanese Encephalitis  100.0
 Lymphatic Filariasis [90 million]  100.0
 Malaria [1 billion]  100.0
 Onchocerciasis-river blindness [66 million]  100.0
 Schistosomiasis [200 million]  100.0
 Tetanus  100.0
 Trachoma  100.0
 Trichuris  100.0
 Trypanosomiasis  100.0
 Leishmaniasis   99.9
 Measles   99.9
 Polio   99.9
 Syphilis   99.9
 Diphtheria   99.8
 Leprosy [12 million]   99.7
 Pertusis   99.6
 Diarrhoeal Diseases   99.5
 Source: World Health Organization (1996); Number of sufferers, Barral (1990).44
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I. Indian Patent Act of 1970 versus GATT
 Patent Act  GATT
1. No product patents allowed for
pharmaceuticals, food products and
agrochemicals. Only process patents.
     No patents for micro-organisms.
2. Process patents for the above have a
statutory term limit of the shorter of 7 years
from application or 5 years from granting.
3. Government retains wide powers to grant
(non-exclusive) compulsory licenses 3 years
after granting.  In the case of
pharmaceuticals, licenses are automatic, i.e.
with no consideration of local working by the
patentee or the ability of the licensee to
produce.  Maximum royalty of 4% of ex-
factory price in bulk form [compared to
typical royalty rates of 10-15%].
4. Importation does not fulfill working
requirement.
5. In all cases, the burden of proof in an  
infringement case falls on the patentee.
Both product and process patents for
pharmaceuticals, food products and
agrochemicals, and micro-organisms.
All patents have a term of at least 20 years from
filing.
No automatic licenses.  Compulsory licenses
only in cases of national emergency, for public
non-commercial use, or to remedy a practice
found after judicial review to be anti-
competitive.  A non-exclusive compulsory
license may be granted only after a license
sought on commercial terms from the patentee
and remuneration should reflect the economic
cost of the license to the patentee.
No discrimination between domestic production
and importation.
In the case of process patents, the burden of
proof lies with the alleged infringer. (Reversal of
the burden of proof.)
Source: Iyer, et. al. (1996).48
II. Recent Events and Future Changes
April 15, 1994 - The Final Act Embodying the Results of  the Uruguay  Round  of  Multilateral Trade
Negotiations was authenticated by 117 nations, including India. 
January  1,  1995 - The Final  Act came into force.  India  is  one of  the countries  with  a  ten  year
transition period to implement the treaty requirements.  This grace period ends December 31, 2004.
January  1  to March  31,  1995 -  Patent  Ordinance  put  in  place  by  the  government,  temporarily
implementing the treaty without requiring legislative approval.
January  1,  1995 - During  the transition period,  India  must  accept  product  patent  applications  for
pharmaceuticals,  so-called  'black  box' applications, and  grant Exclusive  Marketing  Rights  (EMRs). 
These give the patent applicant the exclusive rights to sell and distribute the product for a maximum of
5 years.  EMRs can only be obtained after the pharmaceutical product has been granted a  patent and
has  obtained  marketing  approval  in  another  signatory  country  and  after  marketing  approval  is
obtained in India.  Since EMRs apply only to innovations with priority patent application after January
1, 1995, very few product innovations are likely to qualify.
March, 1995 - Passage of the Patents (Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha (upper house) of parliament
by small majority.  Could not be introduced in the Rajya Sabha (lower house) due to opposition.
January, 1997 - U.S. requests that a WTO dispute panel be constituted to investigate India's failure to
pass implementing legislation to enable the acceptance of black-box product patent applications during
the transition period. (Although they are, in fact, being accepted at the patent offices in anticipation.)
December 31, 1999 - India must bring laws and regulations into conformity with WTO.
December 31, 2004 - India must examine and grant pharmaceutical product patents.49
Appendix III
Price Control - Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) 1995
The Drug Price Control Order  (DPCO)  of  1995 is  the fourth price control order,  following
those in 1970, 1979 and 1987.  Currently 76 Bulk Drugs are subject to price control, down from the
142 bulk drugs controlled under DPCO 1987.  Under the new order, a drug is subject to price control if
annual turnover in the audited  retail  market is  more than 40  million  rupees.  A drug with turnover
above 400 rupees may be exempted if there are at least 5 bulk producers and at least 10 formulators,
none with more than 40% of the audited retail market.  Any bulk drug with turnover above 10 million
rupees and a single formulator with 90% or more of the market is also subject to price control.  Small-
scale firms are no longer free of price control.  The latter closes  a  loophole, preventing small-scale
firms from being used as fronts by larger manufacturers attempting to avoid price controls.
Under DPCO 1995, the government claims that 50% of audited retail sales are now covered by
price control, down from about 70% under the old order.  The industry claims that the percentage of
the market now subject to control is actually far higher (85% in 1993) than the governments' claim
because the governments' claim is based on outdated 1990 sales data.  There are also on-going disputes
between the government and industry about drugs that the industry claims meet the DPCO criteria for
exemption but which are nonetheless being controlled.
Maximum Retail Price calculation for a formulation:
Retail Price = (MC + CC + PM + PC) * (1 + MAPE) + ED
MC - Material cost including bulk drugs used and an allowance for wastage.
CC - Conversion cost - labor, energy, R&D etc.
PM and PC - Packing material and charges.
These values are based on industry norms for large-scale  manufacturers.  They are  calculated
based on a detailed survey last done in 1988.  The government is trying to do a re-survey but firms are
being uncooperative, not wanting the fall in actual wastage to be acknowledged.
MAPE - Maximum allowable post-manufacturing expenses.  Currently a 100% mark-up.  This includes
minimum wholesaler and retailer margins of 8% and 16%, respectively.
ED - Excise duty - small-scale manufacturers have some exemptions, with the amount depending  on
the manufacturer's sales.  Firms with sales under 3 million rupees annually are completely exempt.
In addition to controls on drug prices, maximum returns are also fixed, at 18% on net worth or
26% on capital employed.  No  producers  come close  to these ceilings  so  this part of  the DPCO is
currently not binding.50
Sources: Interviews; Clippings (10/1994); and Government of India, 1994a and 1994b.